By Samira Gaid
The donor focus has favoured federal forces, particularly the Somali National Army (SNA), overlooking regional security units. That has left multiple loosely coordinated armed groups operating at both federal and regional levels, often divided by clan loyalties and political affiliations.
The evidence shows, however, that these local actors are sometimes more effective in protecting civilians than federal forces.
Somalia is at a defining moment. Decades of investment in state-building is threatened by a fragmented political landscape, underfunding of the African Union’s military shield, and a humanitarian system running on fumes.
The future of the AU’s peace enforcement mission is a particular worry. The almost two-decade deployment was supposed to transition to Somali ownership of its security future. But recent gains by the insurgent group al-Shabab have exposed a troubling lack of readiness.
On 1 January 2025, the AU troops were rehatted as the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). But the new designation carries the same structural baggage of previous missions – ambitious mandates, insufficient predictable funding, and capability gaps.
AUSSOM has also been saddled with new geopolitical challenges in tensions between troop contributors Ethiopia and Egypt, and the withdrawal of longstanding military provider Burundi.
Financing – as with previous missions – is the weakest point of the 12,626-strong AUSSOM force. It needs nearly $1 billion to operate, plus $96 million to cover unpaid arrears from its predecessor mission.
The AU has historically relied on a patchwork of funding streams: EU stipends for the troops, logistical help through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and additional capabilities provided bilaterally by other security partners.
The halt to EU stipend financing at the end of 2024 has left a significant funding gap. It underscores the lesson that ad hoc donor pledges, delayed contributions, and gaps in critical capabilities compromise overall mission effectiveness.
The answer to unpredictable financing was supposed to be UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which provides a framework for the 75% financing of AU-led peace support through UN assessed contributions. However, in May the Security Council failed to reach consensus on utilising 2719 for AUSSOM – largely as a result of US opposition.
That has left AUSSOM effectively unable to participate in offensive operations against al-Shabab – its role much more one of backstopping.
Security reform needs political coherence
The Somali Transition Plan, launched in 2018, aimed for a gradual handover of security responsibilities from AU missions to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). However, it has been a problematic journey.
The country’s elite units – trained largely by the United States and Türkiye – have delivered tactical successes, but they are too few in number. The rest of the SNSF is fragmented, corrupt, and largely ineffective.
The donor focus has favoured federal forces, particularly the Somali National Army (SNA), overlooking regional security units. That has left multiple loosely coordinated armed groups operating at both federal and regional levels, often divided by clan loyalties and political affiliations.
The evidence shows, however, that these local actors are sometimes more effective in protecting civilians than federal forces.
Federal and regional leaders have signed on to national security architecture agreements. But clearly the political agreements necessary to rebuild a truly inclusive and capable national army have yet to be made, while local loyalties, rivalries, and chronic funding shortfalls exacerbate the challenges.
Insecurity has a human face. Under Somalia’s Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, approximately 5.9 million Somalis required life saving humanitarian and protection assistance in 2025.
Somalia’s Disaster Management Authority (SoDMA) and UN agencies estimated that between October and December 2025, 4.4 million people will face acute food insecurity, and 1.85 million children under five will be at risk of acute malnutrition, including 421,000 who may experience severe malnutrition.
These appalling statistics have been met with chronic funding shortfalls, forcing agencies to scale back lifesaving support, even as weather shocks and conflict drive new needs. In the case of the World Food Programme, that has meant cutting 750,000 people from food assistance.
“Where states fail to deliver, armed groups step in”
At the heart of Somalia’s decades-long insecurity lies a governance crisis. It shapes the effectiveness of state institutions and their ability to deliver. While military operations can dislodge al-Shabab, standing up effective administrations that can reinforce the government’s legitimacy is a far more complex challenge.
Where states fail to deliver, armed groups step in, collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and providing services aligned with their own interests. This “shadow governance” is in play in Somalia and continues to strengthen insurgent resilience and undermine state authority.
International support has historically prioritised security investments – not the political and governance realm. When governance and services fail to follow the boots on the ground, those security gains will remain fragile.
Somalia’s political fragmentation is a central driver of fragility. Although disputes between Mogadishu and federal member states have existed since the creation of the federation, these challenges have deepened over recent years as the federal government has adopted an increasingly centralising approach.
The unilateral constitutional changes and controversial electoral plans of the current government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have prompted two out of six member states – Puntland and Jubaland – to suspend relations with Mogadishu.
Mohamud’s push for universal suffrage is seen as handing the president an advantage in elections in 2026. Somalia’s current in-direct voting system, in which clan elders hold substantial sway, has an anti-incumbent bias, and has therefore become an issue of deep contention.
At the same time, growing talk of a possible term extension by Mohamud is adding to an already volatile political environment. There are echoes of the conditions that almost led to open war between the political elites in 2021 when then president Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” attempted to hold on to power after his term expired.
Political disputes have already spilled into violence between federal troops and regional forces. In December 2024, there were intense clashes in Ras Kamboni, close to the Kenyan border, between the SNA and Jubaland’s Darawiish paramilitary units.
A way forward
If donors are to salvage their sizable investments in Somalia, amid suggestions of wavering support, a shift in strategy is urgently needed.
The way they fund Somalia reinforces the power gap between the centre and states. By directing most assistance to the federal government, they unintentionally give it more leverage – far outweighing its actual institutional strength or presence across the country.
Predictable funding for the AUSSOM mission is also critical. But security alone is not enough. Aid should help advance governance through dialogue and political negotiation.
This will provide incentives for elites to remain committed to the federation, and political stability can cascade down and give communities reason to align with the state rather than armed groups.
Effective and legitimate security forces will emerge not just from technical reforms or external support, but from political agreements that resolve disputes between communities and between the federal government and regional authorities.
Humanitarian support must also be prioritised. This will close the gaps in critical areas such as food, health, and protection – essential both for saving lives and maintaining legitimacy in contested areas.
These are workable strategies but will need a concerted effort by Somalia’s partners.
Doing nothing or scaling back without a comprehensive plan risks more violence, displacement, and the collapse of already inadequate essential services. Somalia’s long-term stability hinges on this coordinated approach.
This opinion piece was published by the Conversation
Copy rights of all coloured pics by Petterik Wiggers, the black and white ones by Koert Lindijer
